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Notes on John Carter Vincent

Head, Chinese Affairs, State Department
believed to be Red Chinese agent at State Department linked to Owen Lattimore.
The former Communist, Louis Francis Budenz testified under oath
that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, that he,
Budenz, learned this from official reports and that in official
Communist Party circles it was believed that Vincent was a member of
the Communist Party. Budenz based his testimony on statements made by
Communist officials and the Politburo at the time of the Wallace
Mission to China. He called attention to the statement in the Daily
Worker that Vincent and Service were responsible to a great degree for
getting Mr. Hurley out of the State Department. He testified that
it was an official Communist Party secret shared by a few people that
John Carter Vincent was a member of the Chinese Party.

He further testified that the Communists were eager to have Mr.
Vincent obtain a position in this State Department where he could
influence policy.
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:83869.wais

In considering the record in this case I believe it to be of
particular significance that John Carter Vincent was not any immature,
subordinate representative of our State Department, but on the contrary
he was a supposedly experienced, responsible and trusted official who
was born in China and stationed there from April '24 to February 1936,
and from March 1941 to August of 1943, and who thereafter occupied
exceptionally high positions in the Department of State, having to do
with the formulation of our Chinese policies. This makes it peculiarly
difficult to accept Mr. Vincent's wavering and frequently contradictory
testimony that he did not recognize until 1945, at the earliest, that
the Chinese Communists were to any substantial degree controlled and
directed from Moscow. And that in June of 1944 he did not believe
Chiang Kai-shek's statement that the Chinese Communists were affiliated
with or controlled by the USSR. The record is replete with instances
where more subordinate officials were fully cognizant of the
relationship between the Chinese Communists and the USSR.
Bearing this in mind, what does the record show:
1. The former Communist, Louis Francis Budenz testified under oath
that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, that he,
Budenz, learned this from official reports and that in official
Communist Party circles it was believed that Vincent was a member of
the Communist Party. Budenz based his testimony on statements made by
Communist officials and the Politburo at the time of the Wallace
Mission to China. He called attention to the statement in the Daily
Worker that Vincent and Service were responsible to a great degree for
getting Mr. Hurley \28\ out of the State Department. He testified that
it was an official Communist Party secret shared by a few people that
John Carter Vincent was a member of the Chinese Party.
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\28\ Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley.
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He further testified that the Communists were eager to have Mr.
Vincent obtain a position in this State Department where he could
influence policy.
I personally am unable to reject the testimony of Budenz since
although not directly corroborated, it is indirectly corroborated by
much of the other evidence in the case. It is common knowledge to all
members of the Loyalty Review Board who have dealt with cases involving
membership in the Communist Party that direct corroboration is not only
rare but almost impossible. The Federal Bureau of Investigation which
over a long period of time and in many hundreds of cases has utilized
the testimony of Budenz obviously vouches for his veracity and
reliability. The testimony of Budenz has not been impeached and in the
absence of some indication of ulterior motive, hostility or prejudice
which is non-existent, I see no reason to disregard his testimony.
2. Though perhaps to a slightly lesser degree, Mr. Vincent's
opposition to the declared policy of our government and support of the
Communist Party are directly testified to by a number of other
witnesses. General Hurley, General Wedemeyer,\29\ and Admiral Mills,
and Mr. Duman. Their testimony has not been impeached, and by the same
token I see no sound reason to reject their sworn testimony.

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\29\ Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary after lengthy hearings in
which there was ample opportunity for the members of the committee to
see and hear substantially all witnesses having knowledge of the facts,
as well as to examine relevant documents, unanimously concluded that''
John Carter Vincent for many years had been the principal fulcrum of
IPR pressures and influences in the State Department.'' That the IPR
was used by the Communists to promote the interests of the Soviet Union
in the United States, that the ``IPR was the vehicle used by the
Communists to orient American Far Eastern Policy toward Communist
objectives,'' and ``that John Carter Vincent was influential in
bringing about a change in the United State policy favorable to the
Chinese Communists.''
I reviewed in detail the evidence upon which these conclusions were
based and although the phraseology thereof may not have been the best
suited for the purpose, I have no doubt that the evidence is amply
sufficient to support the findings. Any weaknesses in the chain of
evidence are more than compensated for by the entire record, which
almost without a single exception evidences a uniform and strict
adherence to the Communist line of ideology by Mr. Vincent.
4. Mr. Vincent's reports to the State Department regarding
relative strength and activity of the Chinese Communists and of
the army of Chiang Kai-shek vary substantially from the
official United States Army intelligence information.
5. According to uncontradicted testimony, Mr. Vincent's
associates included such notorious Communist sympathizers as
Lattimore, Bison, Adler, Roth, and Friedman.
6. Mr. Duman retired as Chairman of the Far Eastern
Subcommittee of State, War and Navy prior to September 1, 1945,
and was succeeded in that position on that date by Mr. Vincent.
This subcommittee had to do with the promulgation of various
State Department documents dealing with the terms for Japanese
surrender. Mr. Duman has testified to certain basic changes
made in these documents subsequent to his resignation,
reflecting a complete shift of emphasis to the Communist line
from the documents originally drafted by him and approved by
the proper officers of the United States. Mr. Duman's testimony
with respect to these changes is fully corroborated by the
documents themselves, although the precise part played by Mr.
Vincent individually in connection with these changes is not
entirely apparent, the major responsibility admittedly must be
his own. By the same token, Mr. Vincent as head of the Far
Eastern Division must assume the security responsibility of
hundreds of documents and papers in the files of his division
which were later found in the New York office of Amerasia, the
notorious Communist magazine.
Without absolute reliance upon any particular factor to the
exclusion of others, there emerges from the foregoing a general
pattern of Communist activities and sympathy entirely at
variance with the declared and established policy of the
Government of the United States. To my mind this pattern is
clear and unequivocal, and establishes far more than a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Vincent along with Owen Lattimore
adopted and followed the Communist line for many years. I find
no good reason to disbelieve the testimony of Louis Budenz or
the conclusions of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
Therefore, I have a reasonable doubt of the loyalty of Mr. John
Carter Vincent and firmly believe that he should be dismissed
from the service.

The Chairman. I think that perhaps covers the picture as
well as anything.
Senator Dirksen. Yes, it spells it out.
Senator Jackson. Was the FBI able to provide any
information other than that which Mr. Budenz testified to?
Mr. Amen. From Budenz, no.
Senator Dirksen. Other than Budenz?
Mr. Amen. Other than what I stated there.
Senator Dirksen. Did they go back into that? When was he in
China?
Mr. Amen. Vincent, you mean?
Senator Dirksen. Yes, I mean when was that.
Mr. Amen. He was there from April '24 to February 1936.
Senator Dirksen. That is April 1924.
Mr. Amen. April 1924 until February 1936.
Senator Dirksen. Was he working for the State Department at
that time?
Mr. Amen. Yes, and of course he was born there, and he was
stationed there, yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. That is unusual to keep a man there
fourteen years?
Mr. Amen. That is one of the points, of course, for him now
to say he doesn't know anything about any connection between
the Chinese Communists and the USSR in 1945, when he had been
there all of the time and everybody else who was there
certainly knew of it.
Senator Dirksen. He was there when the Fourth Route Army
was being organized, and the Communists became a pretty
effective entity within China.
Mr. Amen. Certainly, sir.
Senator Dirksen. That is when they started, in 1922, did
they not, in 1923 or 1922?
Mr. Amen. I couldn't give you the exact year, but certainly
during that period.
Senator Dirksen. And then he was back again when?
Mr. Amen. He was back again from March of 1941 to August of
1943.
Senator Dirksen. Where was he in the interim, from 1936 to
1941? What I was asking about, was his activities and so on.
Mr. Amen. Isn't that when he was in Switzerland? I am not
certain.
Senator Jackson. I thought he was in Switzerland after the
war.
Mr. Amen. He was minister to Switzerland at some point.
Senator Dirksen. He was back here for quite a while.
Mr. Amen. He was on the China desk here for a long time
after that.
Another unfortunate element in the case was that these
persons whom I mentioned in here such as Wedemeyer and others,
who initially were very positive in their statements with
respect to the undermining, and I include of course Hurley,
later on apparently decided that they would ease up a little
bit. They never retracted what they had said but they softened
it over and they wrote a letter as I recall it, I think it was
in this case, although it might have been in the case where the
same situation existed, that sort of took the sting out of the
initial testimony.
Senator Jackson. Was that General Wedemeyer and who else?
Mr. Amen. It was Wedemeyer.
Senator Jackson. And General Hurley?
Mr. Amen. General Hurley, that is all that I would recall
at the moment.
Senator Jackson. Was there any indication that anybody
pressured them?
Mr. Amen. Not in the record or not to my knowledge.
Senator Jackson. That would be interesting to find out.
Senator Dirksen. What is the line of authority for the
secretary of state to take the action that he does? Is that
clear?
Mr. Amen. You mean Dulles taking this action? I think there
is a basic provision that the secretary of state can remove
anyone they wish for, so to speak, the good of the service,
which is presumably the grounds utilized by Dulles here. But
otherwise, so far as I know, there is no precedent. In other
words, there has never been a case decided by the Loyalty
Review Board where it has subsequently ever been referred to
anybody else for any purpose. Supposedly that was the court of
last resort.
Senator Dirksen. Vincent was allowed to resign, was that
it?
Mr. Amen. As I understand it he was allowed to resign, and
to get his pension.
Senator Dirksen. That is his accumulated annuity under the
Civil Service System, is that right?
Mr. Amen. Well, it is more than accumulated. It was
whatever funds were built up as a result of what lie put in,
but I mean it is not just returning his money.
Senator Dirksen. He got full benefits, and matched public
funds along with it.
Mr. Amen. Full pension benefits.
Senator Dirksen. So that the very fact that he was
permitted to resign instead of being dismissed, preserved
intact those rights he had under the retirement system, and so
that is the crux of the thing.
Mr. Amen. That is right.http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:83869.wais

Public Papers of the Presidents • Harry S. Truman • 1952-53

362
Memorandum on the Secretary of State's Recommendation in the Case of John Carter Vincent.
January 3, 1953

Memorandum to the Secretary of State:

I have read your memorandum of today concerning the case of John Carter Vincent. I think the suggestions which you make are well taken and I authorize and direct you to proceed in the manner which you have outlined.
HARRY S. TRUMAN

NOTE: The text of the Secretary of State's memorandum to the President follows:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Case of John Carter Vincent

I have recently been advised by Chairman Bingham of the Loyalty Review Board that a panel of the Loyalty Review Board has considered the case of Mr. John Carter Vincent, a Foreign Service Officer with class of Career Minister. Chairman Bingham also advises me that while the panel did not find Mr. Vincent guilty of disloyalty, it has reluctantly concluded that there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the Government of the United States. Chairman Bingham further advises me that it is therefore the recommendation of the Board that the services of Mr. Vincent be terminated.

Such a recommendation by so distinguished a Board is indeed serious and impressive and must be given great weight. The final responsibility, however, for making a decision as to whether Mr. Vincent should be dismissed is that of the Secretary of State. I am advised that any doubt which might have previously existed on this point has been removed by the recent decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in James Kutcher, Appellant, v. Carl Gray, Jr., Veterans Administration, Appellee. That case establishes that the action of the Board is a recommendation "just that .... nothing more" and that in the last analysis, upon the Head of the Department is imposed "the duty to impartially determine on all the evidence" the proper disposition of the case.

A most important item on which I must rely in exercising this responsibility, is the communication from Chairman Bingham in which he advised me of the conclusion reached by his panel. This communication contains elements which raise serious problems.

In the first place, I note a statement that the panel has not accepted or rejected the testimony of Mr. Budenz that he recalls being informed by others that Mr. Vincent was a Communist and under Communist discipline. The panel also states that it does not accept or reject the findings of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate with respect to Mr. Vincent and the Institute of Pacific Relations or the findings of the Committee with respect to the participation of Mr. Vincent in the development of United States policy towards China in 1945. The panel, however, proceeds to state that, although it has not accepted or rejected these factors, it has taken them into account. I am unable to interpret what this means. If the panel did take these factors into account, this means that it must have relied upon them in making its final determination. Yet I am unable to understand how these factors could have played a part in the final determination of the panel if these factors were neither accepted nor rejected by the Board.

This is not merely a point of language. It is a point of real substance. It is difficult for me to exercise the responsibility which is mine under the law with the confusion which has been cast as to the weight which the panel gave to the charges of Mr. Budenz or the findings of the Senate Committee.

The communication from the panel raises another issue which goes to the heart of operation of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. It is the issue of accurate reporting. The communication contains the following statement:

"The panel notes Mr. Vincent's studied praise of Chinese Communists and equally studied criticism of the Chiang Kai-shek Government throughout a period when it was the declared and established policy of the Government of the United States to support Chiang Kai-shek's Government."

Mr. Vincent's duty was to report the facts as he saw them. It was not merely to report successes of existing policy but also to report on the aspects in which it was failing and the reasons therefor. If this involved reporting that situations existed in the administration of the Chinese Nationalists which had to be corrected if the Nationalist Government was to survive, it was his duty to report this. If this involved. a warning not to underestimate the combat potential of the Chinese Communists, or their contribution to the war against Japan, it was his duty to report this. In the hearings which followed the relief of General MacArthur, General Wedemeyer has testified that he has made reports equally as critical of the administration of the Chinese Nationalists.

The great majority of reports which Mr. Vincent drafted were reviewed and signed by Ambassador Gauss, an outstanding expert in the Far East. Ambassador Gauss has made it crystal clear that in his mind the reports drafted by Mr. Vincent were both accurate and objective.

I do not exclude the possibility that in this or in any other case a board might find that the reports of an officer might or might not disclose a bias which might have a bearing on the issue of his loyalty. But in so delicate a matter, affecting so deeply the integrity of the Foreign Service, I should wish to be advised by persons thoroughly familiar with the problems and procedures of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. This involves an issue far greater in importance than the disposition of a loyalty case involving one man. Important as it is to do full justice to the individual concerned, it is essential that we should not by inadvertence take any step which might lower the high traditions of our own Foreign Service to the level established by governments which will permit their diplomats to report to them only what they want to hear.

The memorandum from Mr. Bingham indicates that the Board also took into account "Mr. Vincent's failure properly to discharge his responsibilities as Chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of State, War and Navy to supervise the accuracy or security of State Department documents emanating from that Subcommittee." The statement which refers to the security of the files seems to me to be inadvertent. Presumably it is a reference to the fact that State Department documents were involved in the Amerasia case. However, in the many Congressional investigations which have followed that case it has not been suggested that Mr. Vincent had any responsibility for those documents. I have not discovered any such evidence in the file in this case. The reference to the accuracy of the State Department documents emanating from that Committee is obscure. In any case, while it might be relative to Mr. Vincent's competence in performing his duties, it does not seem to me to have any bearing on the question of loyalty.

The report finally refers to Mr. Vincent's association with numerous persons "who, he had reason to believe," were either Communists or Communist sympathizers. This is indeed a matter which, if unexplained, is of importance and clearly relevant. It involves inquiry as to whether this association arose in the performance of his duties or otherwise. It further involves an inquiry as to the pattern of Mr. Vincent's close personal friends and whether he knew or should have known that any of these might be Communists or Communist sympathizers.

All these matters raised in my mind the necessity for further inquiry. This further inquiry was made possible by the documents in this proceeding which you provided me upon my request. I find upon examining the documents that the recommendation made by the panel of the Loyalty Review Board was made by a majority of one, two of the members believing that no evidence had been produced which led them to have a doubt as to Mr. Vincent's loyalty. In this situation, I believe that I cannot in good conscience and in the exercise of my own judgment, which is my duty under the law, carry out this recommendation of the Board. I do not believe, however, that in the exercise of my responsibility to the Government, I can or should let the matter rest here. I believe that I must ask for further guidance.

I, therefore, ask your permission to seek the advice of some persons who will combine the highest judicial qualifications of weighing the evidence with the greatest possible familiarity of the works and standards of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, both in reporting from the field and making decisions in the Department. If you approve, I should propose to ask the following persons to examine the record in this case and to advise me as to what disposition in their judgment should be made in this case.
            Judge Learned B. Hand, who, until his retirement, has been the senior judge for the United States Circuit Court
            of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to serve as Chairman;
            Mr. John J. McCloy, former High Commissioner for Germany;
            Mr. James Grafton Rogers, former Assistant Secretary of State under Secretary Stimson;
            Mr. G. Howland Shaw, a retired Foreign Service Officer and a former Assistant Secretary of State under
            Secretary Hull; and
            Mr. Edmund Wilson, a retired Foreign Service Officer and former Ambassador.

I should ask them to read the record in this case and at their earliest convenience inform the Secretary of State of their conclusions.
DEAN O. ACHESON
Secretary of State

Gary May, China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent (1979)
Vincent, John Carter. The Extraterritorial System in China, Final Phase Harvard East Asian Monographs January 1970
China Expert John P. Davies Dies