In 1964 Iran was emerging from a recession that weakened the Pahlavi Government. Oil revenues were up and there was a definite promise of steady increase in Oil revenue. -1- Unfortunately the Shah was a weak man more concerned with military toys and playing soldier than caring for his people. -2- Pahlavi was no longer to make a plausible case for a Soviet threat so he argued endlessly that there was an Arab threat.
By January 1964 the financial pressure of Vietnam began to affect our commitment to military assistance tito Iran . FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (b)
882. Ayatollah Khomeini, at first imprisoned and later under house detention in connection 1963 Moharam riots and widely regarded as leading contender for position of Shia paramount leader, was released April 5 and returned to religious center of Qom. Press giving minimum play. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports (1) millahs flocking to Qom from all over Iran to “kiss hands”, and (2) one tank battalion concentrated Qom outskirts as precautionary measure. No info whether Khomeini reached agreement with govt regarding any restriction on his future activities. Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contacts with good connections in religious community view release as victory for Khomeini but also as wise policy decision by regime in preparation for Moharam, period of deep mourning starting May 13. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (b)
Memorandum From Commander John J. Shanahan to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (Max Taylor). Washington, April 11, 1964. The Shah states that the situation in the Middle East has deteriorated since November. He cites:
(1) Pak-Indian relations.
(2) Turkey-Greece problem.
(3) UK withdrawal from bases in Malta and Cyprus.
(4) Bases in Libya are threatened.
(5) Recent strengthening of Arab unity.
(6) Forecast Arab aggression against Israel in 2 or 3 years.
b. The Shah expressed hope that the April meetings in Washington would make useful progress; felt CENTO was not accomplishing much in a military way because of Pak attitude and US not being a member. Gen. Adams expressed confidence that meetings would be productive and US interest was intense in seeing that CENTO succeeds.
c. Shah stated Iran has more to fear from Soviet-supported Arabs than from Soviets.
d. -1- Shah described Iran’s future as bright because of current development of vast resources, and the social and economic reforms that are being implemented. He estimated the country’s income from oil by 1970 would reach $1,200 million annually. Accordingly, Iran, the Shah pointed out, should play an increasingly important role in US strategic planning.
e. The Shah expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of his military defenses. (I suggest that up to
this point it was all a build-up.)
April 15 1964 Ayatollah Khomeini delivers speach critical of the Shah which causes worry since he was just relleased from custody. Ayatollah Khomeini charged the Shah was , “giving away our resources to foreigners”. He was also calling for a constitution form of government. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (b)
1964 “Congo. The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners.” Use of U.S. Forces Abroad.
1964-73 “Vietnam War. U.S. military advisers had been in South Vietnam a decade, and their numbers had been increased as the military position the Saigon government became weaker. After the attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson asked for a resolution expressing U.S. determination to support freedom and protect peace in Southeast Asia. Congress responded with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, expressing support for “all necessary measures” the President might take to repel armed attacks against U.S. forces and prevent further aggression. Following this resolution, and following a Communist attack on a U.S. installation in central Vietnam, the United States escalated its participation in the war to a peak of 543 000 in April 1969.” Use of U.S. Forces Abroad.
By January 1964 the financial preure of Vietnam began to affect our commitment to military assistance tito Iran . FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (b)
882. Ayatollah Khomeini, at first imprisoned and later under house detention in connection 1963 Moharam riots and widely regarded as leading contender for position of Shia paramount leader, was released April 5 and returned to religious center of Qom. Press giving minimum play. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports (1) millahs flocking to Qom from all over Iran to “kiss hands”, and (2) one tank battalion concentrated Qom outskirts as precautionary measure. No info whether Khomeini reached agreement with govt regarding any restriction on his future activities. Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contacts with good connections in religious community view release as victory for Khomeini but also as wise policy decision by regime in preparation for Moharam, period of deep mourning starting May 13. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (b)
Memorandum From Commander John J. Shanahan to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (Max Taylor). Washington, April 11, 1964. The Shah states that the situation in the Middle East has deteriorated since November. He cites:
(1) Pak-Indian relations.
(2) Turkey-Greece problem.
(3) UK withdrawal from bases in Malta and Cyprus.
(4) Bases in Libya are threatened.
(5) Recent strengthening of Arab unity.
(6) Forecast Arab aggression against Israel in 2 or 3 years.
April 15 1964 Ayatollah Khomeini delivers speach critical of the Shah which causes worry since he was just relleased from custody. Ayatollah Khomeini charged the Shah was , “giving away our resources to foreigners”. He was also calling for a constitution form of government. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (b)
Washington, May 13, 1964. Bowling at State requests deportation of anti-Shah students who are planing anti-Shah rally at UCLA when Pahlavi was slated to speak there. Bowling cited “personal friendships between anti-Shah leadersand prominent Americans, such as Justice Douglas,” as reason to deport the aniti-shah leaders. “The immediate pressing of deportation proceedings against Ali Shayegan (see Tab A),/2/ who falsely stated in his visa application that he had never been a member of a communist organization, would appear to be perfectly tailored for the present situation. There is no basis for pity for Shayegan. He informed an NEA officer personally less than a year ago that he intended to dedicate the remainder of his life to the destruction of the Shah. You may remember him as being the most fanatical and anti-Western member of Mosadeq’s last cabinet, except for Foreign Minister Fatemi, who was executed.” FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (b)
National Intelligence Estimate – Iran, May 1964
Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Julius Holmes) to Secretary of State Rusk
Tehran, May 20, 1964.
A seldom discussed but vital element in our relationship with Iran is the agreement of the Shah which
permits us to continue a series of U.S. technical intelligence operations in various parts of Iran. For
the most part, the nature of many of these activities is such that they cannot be concealed from the
public, and it is only through the Shah’s approval, and in certain instances through direct Iranian
participation, that we are able to continue these activities.
More specifically, the activities include:
a) The establishment and maintenance of [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. These activities require the presence of upwards of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] civilian and service personnel, plus dependents.
b) The establishment and maintenance of [1 line of source text not declassified] facilities.
c) The Customs-free importation of technical and other logistic support required for the above activities.
d) The Shah has also given personal approval for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] intelligence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operations [3 lines of source text not declassified].
I should rather not specify the precise objectives or results obtained from these activities which, I am told, are of critical value to us. However, John McCone could inform you of how important they are to our national security. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (b)
-2- Though we’ve kept telling the Shah that his real problems are internal not external, and that reform is first on the agenda, he keeps reverting to the military toys he loves. We’ve convinced him there isn’t much chance of Soviet attack, so now he’s talking up an Arab threat as his excuse. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 4, 1964. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (d)
Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 178, Iran, 19-4-a, Five-Year Agreement, 1965-69. Secret. Drafted by Walsh.
SUBJECT Military Modernization Discussions with the Shah of Iran
PARTICIPANTS The Shah of Iran – Defense and State
The atmosphere was friendly. The Shah had just arrived some minutes before from Los Angeles. He appeared tired and somewhat melancholy. One had the impression that the demonstrations in Los Angeles had depressed him. There was a huge crowd in front of the Waldorf. According to the police, it was entirely friendly with no demonstrators present. Nevertheless, the fact that he had once again been confronted with a large crowd may have recalled to his mind some of his irritation about what happened in Los Angeles. At one stage in the discussion, the Shah said that he was subject to what one might call an international conspiracy led by the communists with the active assistance of Nasser and the Arabs. In one demonstration in Los Angeles, according to the Shah, there were only six Iranians and the other demonstrators seemed to have been American communists and Arab students. He spoke with manifest irritation about an incident in Los Angeles; apparently a plane flew over the ceremony at UCLA carrying a banner that said “If you want a fix, see the Shah.” He said he asked people “What is a fix?” and they told him it was heroin. He said with bitterness that this smearing attack was made against him despite his efforts to kill off this dirty drug. If I am involved in heroin, he added, one should say that I am a terribly poor salesman and that I am working against my “sales interest.” Memorandum of Conversation John Patrick Walsh, NEA/NR State, New York, June 12, 1964. (Major General George, Eckhardt, Chief MAAG/Tehran, Colonel W.B. Taylor, DOD/ISA, Colonel Ray W. Hodgson, DOD/ILN nad Pahlavi) FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (d)
June 16, 1964 “Need a fix? See the Shah”
The Mansur Government appears to be a definite improvement over its predecessor, both in respect to the leadership provided by the Prime Minister and in respect to substantive administrative improvements. The Parliament has not increased in political importance. The reform program has made no particular progress. The New Iran Party is displaying some forward movement and seems to become an asset to the regime. The opposition’s capacity for making trouble has probably further declined, and this is also true of the mullahs. Some minor changes have occurred in the “pecking order”, but the Shah of course still determines everyone’s status. The tribal situation is definitely better in the south, and under control in the west. Airgram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, A-60 Tehran, August 6, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot; coordinated with [text not declassified], First Secretary John A. Armitage; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Dhahran, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. SUBJECT Semi-Annual Assessment of the Political Situation in Iran FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (f)
Tehran, October 13, 1964, The Majlis granted Diplomatic Imunity to all American Service personel in Iran.Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 14, 1964, 8 p.m. where. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (f)
Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/
Tehran, November 4, 1964, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Jidda, Karachi, and Kuwait.
508. Embtel 278./2/ Reliably reported that Ayatollah Khomeini, dissident religious leader, was arrested in Qom yesterday, brought to Tehran, and taken across the border to exile in Turkey. As reported NIT-6560, Khomeini clearly over-stepped bounds when, in connection with criticism of the Status Bill according immunities to U.S. military advisors, he not only attacked approval of bill by Majlis as disgraceful, illegal, and “against Islam and the Koran” but also called for overthrow of the govt by the Imperial Iranian Army./3/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Part of Tehran bazaar closed down, but city quiet. Tehran radio announced exile today without specifying where. FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran (f)
Gudarzian Case
Prince Mahmud Reza’s difficulties with Gudarzian
SpongoBongo Blog 